Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis: The Problem of Unrecognized Identity

Hnin Htet Htet Aung
(Burmese independent researcher)
July 18, 2025

 

Introduction

It has been seven years since the Myanmar military began its active genocide on the Rohingya people. The systematic state-led atrocities toward the Rohingya community created a severe crisis in which more than 740,000 Rohingya people have had to flee their homes to seek a secure place. Along with all the other abuses imposed upon them, they have suffered from unfair policy response to their citizenship and basic human rights. Since 1982, the government of Myanmar has made efforts to deprive Rohingya people of citizenship. Not only political factors but also religious factors ignited the Rohingya crisis: nationalist Buddhist monks with military support sermonize hate speech against the Muslim community, in which Rohingya people are primarily included.

While military and security forces increased the rate of abuses against Rohingya people, the National League for Democracy (NLD) government also failed to protect this population and to criticize the actions of the military and its political party. Moreover, the military proxy party, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), has taken the lead in rejecting the Rohingya ethnicity and spreading anti-Rohingya propaganda. In 2017, UNOCHA cited the number of Rohingya forced to flee Myanmar into Bangladesh as more than 773,000; but by 2021 the number had increased to over 860,000, excluding those in Malaysia, India, and other countries, according to the UNHCR’s report.^[1]

The military’s genocide campaign that started in 1977 with Operation Dragon King^[2] – which forced 200,000 Rohingya people across the border to Bangladesh – also led to persecution and arrests, according to the data of Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).^[3] Alongside the widespread repatriation, the military stopped the food supply to decrease the number of Rohingya people in Myanmar, causing the death of some 1,000 individuals. MSF also provided data on the flow of its support to Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh in 1991–1992.

After the coup staged on February 1, 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed, pushed by the Committee Representation Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, law makers and parliamentarians ousted by the military. Shortly thereafter, the NUG accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to hear the case against Myanmar concerning Rohingya genocide, withdrawing all its earlier objections to the case.^[4] While Myanmar is in tragedy, Rohingya people have appeared in the international arena to raise their concern not only for their own people but also for the people of Myanmar more generally, even in the absence of support from the civilian government, with the purpose of attracting attention from the international community and seeking justice for committed crimes against them . After the military coup, Rohingya activists assumed a ministerial role alongside the NUG, working together with pro-democratic actors. In a notable moment, Wai Wai Nu, a Rohingya activist delivered a speech at a United Nations Security Council Arria-Formula meeting in New York, raising her voice about the worsening situation in Myanmar.^[5] The participation of Rohingya people demonstrates that their identity can express solidarity with the Bamar and other ethnic groups. Rohingya activists have disclosed how their people in refugee camps in Bangladesh are supporting the movement in Myanmar against military brutality.^[6] Rohingya youth, activists, and leaders are showing their solidarity with Myanmar people who resist the coup, utilizing their Rohingya identity to attract media attention on the international stage. The issue of Rohingya identity has remained visible for the international community even as the situation in Ukraine is assuming a vital role in global security, and ongoing conflicts such as Gaza are capturing the attention and concern of world leaders. Meanwhile, the military coup in 2021 complicated the resumption of Rohingya repatriation, with more than 971,904 Rohingya people still in the Cox’s Bazar camps as of April 2024, according to UNHCR and Government of Bangladesh.^[7]

What is the role of identity in the context of the Rohingya crisis? Why are anti-Rohingya people unable to recognize the Rohingya identity? To answer these questions, I conduct a conceptual analysis on self-identity which shows how individual identities interconnect, and how the lack of ability to recognize others’ self-identity is a problem of the government’s political integrity.

 

Identity Crisis and Its Significance in Political and Ethnic Conflicts

Mahabuba Uddin^[8] highlighted the social identity crisis that occurs when people suffer from the ignorance of the majority, who do not accept them as members of the society. He also addressed the notion of political identity crisis to explore the pressure in domestic and international politics to make use of minority people to fulfill one’s own self-interest. Grounded on this conceptual knowledge, he claimed that the primary cause of violence against the Rohingya population has to do with identity. However, people sometimes forget the social process of identification and authentication. To highlight and justify actions and stories, people need to have knowledge of relevant identity criteria – or decoding capabilities – on someone’s identity symbols. Under self-affirmation theory in the philosophy of constructivism, people have a basic motivation which maintains self-integrity when they face a threat. According to Tovi Fenster,^[9] each person has a variety of identities based on his or her gender, age, class, race, religion, and political orientation. This essay argues that maintaining ethnic identities should be fundamental to upholding both citizenship and human rights. However, preserving this separation is shown in the real world, in multiethnic communities as well as in most planning systems. Moreover, Smith asserts that collective planning has a propensity to think in terms of the needs of the state rather than its individual parts or unique identities, particularly when such needs are related to the cultural and socio-psychological spheres. He also affirmed that “Man can regain his identity only through solidarity with his community. He must recognize within himself the deep roots and affinities of his ‘national’ nature. He must accept these if he would regain his inner harmony.”

Regarding national identity, Jose Aleman and Dwayne Woods^[10] believe that letting the data speak makes it possible to reveal the information of individual identification with the nation. The authors also stress that the policies of the government and media outrage – rather than interpersonal ties – can be the actors which construct the schemas of the nation. The presence of Rohingya people in the governing body can be found since 1947, just before the independence from Britain in 1948.^[11] Despite the refusal of those who are not able to accept ethnic models of citizenship for Rohingya people, history verifies that Rohingya people had an ethnic national identity ahead of the independence of Myanmar. The distinction between civic and ethnicity-based identification is directly related to right of soil and right of blood based on citizenship regimes, according to Goodman.^[12] Goodman notes that a child born in the territory of a nation or state is determined to have birthright citizenship, regardless of parental citizenship. In this regard, Myanmar’s citizenship law (1982) doesn’t comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights based on the principle of non-discrimination and the right of nationality for everyone, as criticized by Burma Campaign UK.^[13] To explain in detail, the citizenship law of 1982 established a hierarchy of citizenship categories that essentially creates a distinction between first- and second-class citizens while enshrining the idea of “national races” in law. Many Myanmar citizens who have lived in the country for their whole lives, including members of entire ethnic groups and children of mixed heritage, have been effectively made stateless under this system.

 

Government Policies Against the Rohingya

Although the international community and civil society put their hopes on the NLD government which won most seats in Parliament (and therefore had the strength to draft bills and law favorable to the Rohingya people), it failed to address the Rohingya issue. The news agency Myanmar Now released a video about the 2020 election campaign. The video conveys the message of the NLD’s election commission on the performance of the independent candidate who wrote “To make NO Rohingya policy” on his campaign billboard. The election commission is quoted as stating that “if there are controversial descriptions that do not comply with election law, everyone can file a formal complaint to the election commission, but the commission is not obligated to check all the campaign billboards of each representative, nor is it possible to follow up to take action.” The attitude of the commission makes it obvious that the NLD government was not much concerned about the Rohingya crisis, despite the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law’s Chapter XIII: Election Offences and Penalties which prohibits “uttering, making speeches, making declarations and instigating to vote or not to vote on grounds of race and religion or by abetment of such acts.”^[14]

Even though Article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims the right to vote in elections to elect parliamentary representatives, Rohingya people from Myanmar were denied this right due to their identity. Beyond their electoral rights, they were also rejected by the Thein Sein government as having a “Rohingya” identity, according to the spokesperson for President Thein Sein in 2011.^[15] The reason given is that the Thein Sein government cannot recognize the term “Rohingya” and prefers the term “stateless minority.”  Moreover, the 1982 citizenship law poses an obstacle for Rohingya people to access the rights of citizenship. In the law, the category “National Races” includes no legal designation for Rohingya people. Subsequently, the Thein Sein government enacted “Protection of Race and Religion” legislation comprising four different laws: The Religious Conversion Law, The Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law, The Population Control Healthcare Law, and The Monogamy Law.^[16]

 

Political Manipulation and Religious Nationalism in the Rohingya Crisis

In 2012, a couple of anti-Muslim rallies were organized by Buddhist nationalist monks who spread hate speech about Muslims. At the same time, the group of monks demanded that the government should enact restrictions on Rohingya people in Rakhine State, limiting the human rights of Muslim people. In 2014, the Patriotic Association of Myanmar, abbreviated Ma Ba Tha in Burmese, was founded with an anti-Muslim agenda. Although naming themselves as a “Patriotic Association,” they became known as a “Racist Buddhist Organization.” Meanwhile, another movement (969 Movement) with the same agenda as Ma Ba Tha was founded to disseminate anti-Muslim propaganda and encourage boycott of Muslim community businesses. The leader of Ma Ba Tha, U Wirathu, even praised the man who shot U Ko Ni, the Muslim lawyer of the head of the NLD, with the support of the military.

The USDP registered in 2010 with the purpose of running for election, although it had started as the Union Solidarity and Development Association, created in 1993 by the State Law and Order Restoration Council.^[17] Along with Thein Sein, the party assumed the role of governance from 2010 to 2011 when the NLD and other parties boycotted the 2010 election. Regarding the Rohingya people, the leader of the USDP said that “I cannot accept useless people in our country.”^[18] In 2017, the party led a coalition of 20 political parties to give the message to the international community that Myanmar does not have a “Rohingya ethnicity.” On the other hand, the party also controls Buddhist nationalist monks to fuel an extremist nationalist movement^[19] and to criticize the NLD party before the nationwide election.

 

Responding to the Rohingya Crisis: Local and Global Players

Not only the domestic but the international community need to be considered as actors in the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, even though the state bears the greatest responsibility. Regarding the domestic actors, people from Rakhine state, political parties, and local organizations are being engaged as actors in the crisis; but the Rakhine state government, the ruling party, and the Union government have been seen separately from other domestic actors since the impact of their response to the crisis is stronger. The Thein Sein government’s reaction on the Rohingya issue can be seen as systematic discrimination despite the government’s role to take responsibility for its people with the purpose of human security. Instead, his government announced^[20] that they can only take care of ethnic nationalities and not border-crossing illegal Rohingyas who cannot be identified as an ethnic group of Myanmar.

In 2016, the NLD government led by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi formed the Kofi Annan Commission,^[21] including local and international experts with the purpose of finding a sustainable solution to the conflicts in Rakhine state. Former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, became the head of the Commission aiming to address the root causes of the crisis. Along with its report, the Commission encouraged the NLD government to revise its policy regarding birth certificates and citizenship for children born in Rakhine, preventing the increased rate of stateless population, especially among the Muslim community.

The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) was established by the UN Human Rights Council for Myanmar with the aim of collecting evidence of serious international crimes to analyze them. The IIMM delegation visited Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar in 2019 and 2022, conducting dialogues with Rohingya representatives to listen their concerns and to demonstrate the importance of Rohingya people’s safety and security for the IIMM. Earlier, the United Nations Human Rights Council had formed another mission called IIFFMM (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar) with the same mandate as the IIMM, but it handed over the collection of evidence to the IIMM in August 2019.^[22]

 

Identity Insecurity, Collective Efforts, and Struggle for Rohingya Recognition

Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” The right to self-identification is critical for being “equal in dignity. Sheldon Stryker, one of the originators of identity theory, asserts that “a person has an identity for each of the different positions in society.” Further, people in society label one another in terms of the positions they occupy, such as teacher or judge. But in this case, people need to use a reflexive aspect of the self to label themselves based on positional designations. On these grounds, the people who are against the Rohingya label them as Bengali to ensure that they are not among Myanmar’s 135 ethnic groups. It seems that anti-Rohingya people do not notice that the identity of diverse ethnic groups binds them to each other. And the impact of not recognizing can affect the state, social harmony, and the identity of individuals. Examining the self-identity of anti-Rohingya people, a key question is whether identity insecurity becomes the cause to rally against the Rohingya people. If so, we need to find the main reason for identity insecurity and how it can affect society under the military regime. Related to identity insecurity, Massey and Cionea^[23] noted that there are two intercultural communication models: the contextual theory of interethnic communication and identity negotiation theory where identity insecurity is conceptualized as a critical factor. The authors also described how identity insecurity is intimately tied to one’s judgment of oneself and others, including feelings of fear or defensiveness toward others, which are associated with worse communication outcomes. Here, the identity negotiation theory of Ting-Toomey  is especially relevant in its core assumptions on identity insecurity where “individuals in all cultures or ethnic groups have the basic motivation needs for identity security.”^[24] To ensure the right of self-identification, scholars and experts may investigate the jurisprudence of self-identification for each ethnicity across the world alongside Rohingya, also taking into consideration the historical and legal aspects.

Individual, interpersonal, and social processes rooted inside social systems comprise identities. According to Jenny Davis, Tony Love, and Phoenicia Fares, collective identity as a type of group/social identity broadens the scope and explanatory power of identity theory and social identity theory^[25]. Again, speaking of collective identity, Alexander Wendt sees “self-interest and collective interest as effects of the extent to which and manner in which social identities involve an identification with the fate of the other (whether singular or plural).”^[26] To respond to a specific threat, the coalition of self-interest becomes a collective force to perform collective action for their identity. In Brian Greenhill’s account, recognition theory will fail for fundamental change in the international forum if there is no credible mechanism for collective identity formation. In this case, recognition can be seen in the ethnic sense, based on the human need to be recognized in a certain form^[27].

If that is the case, the struggle of Rohingya people for recognition becomes the cause of change in the region when they organize with each other to create collective force for their collective identity. Based on this logic, some Muslim people in Yangon, the capital city of Myanmar, did not refer to themselves as Rohingya but just Rakhine-Muslim. Nevertheless, after the Rohingya genocide began in 2017, they started to use “Rohingya” as a descriptor for themselves to show solidarity with their people in the crisis. In such a circumstance, we can obviously see the relationships between Wendt’s theory of identity and Hegel’s theory of recognition, based on the collective action of Rohingya people. Also relevant is the argument of Mohamad Rosyidin about the collective identity of stakeholders in the Rohingya crisis, in particular ASEAN^[28]. He highlights the failure of ASEAN’s performance regarding enforcement of respect for human rights in the region as a main stakeholder that nonetheless lacks specific policies on refugees and asylum seekers. At the same time, the issue of citizenship remains central to the persecution, statelessness, and insecurity of the Rohingyas.

 

Conclusion

Rohingya people spoke out not only for their own group but for Myanmar people more generally, including anti-Rohingya people, when the NLD government defended against accusations of genocide committed by the military. While ongoing conflicts, including the situation in Gaza and the Russia–Ukraine war, have emerged as threats to global security and have captured international media coverage, the identity of Rohingya people is helping Myanmar to be visible in the international arena. Despite the NUG government’s effort to recognize the identity of Rohingya people, the position of the ousted NLD government needs to be considered beyond the coup. Having said that, the cooperation of Rohingya people in the revolution has had significant gains since most Myanmar people have come to acknowledge the identity issue, which can in turn help to build social harmony. After the military coup staged in 2021, it became clear that the Myanmar military has a history of trying to deprive political identities, including national and political parties. At the same moment, several people from Myanmar rose up to stand with Rohingya people, as reported in a Time interview with a transgender advocate from Myanmar.^[29]

To better comprehend the complexities of the circumstances in Myanmar, constructive theory can be a potent tool. With this knowledge, policymakers from the NUG government can decide how best to assist the Rohingya people in gaining more security, and advancement within Myanmar’s society. This is a matter of identity and human rights that needs to be addressed from the social and political standpoint. Together, all parties involved must develop ways to empower this community of vulnerable people so they can retake their proper place in society with dignity and respect. Therefore, the identity of Rohingya people and their representation in the governing body of the state will remain a political puzzle in Myanmar beyond the revolution.

 

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Notes

[1] UNHCR, “The Displaced and Stateless of Myanmar in the Asia-Pacific Region,” UNHCR, (2021). (https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/displaced-and-stateless-myanmar-asia-pacific-region-overview-current-situation, Accessed on 2022–10–24)

[2] Human Rights Watch, “Historical Background of Arakan,” HRW Reports, (2000). (https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm Accessed on 2022–10–27)

[3] Doctors Without Borders, “Timeline: A Visual History of the Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Doctors Without Borders – USA, (2020). (https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/timeline-visual-history-rohingya-refugee-crisis Accessed on 2022-11– 3)

[4] Rebecca Barber, “Inching Forward But a Long Road Ahead to Achieve Justice for the Rohingya,” Just Security (2022). (https://www.justsecurity.org/83108/rohingya-justice-inching-forward/ Accessed on 2022–11–7)

[5] Progressive Voice, “Remarks by Wai Nu, Founder and Executive Director of Women’s Peace Network – United Nations Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting on Myanmar”, Progressive Voice (2023). (https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2023/05/19/remarks-by-wai-wai-nu-founder-and-executive-director-of-womens-peace-network-united-nations-security-council-arria-formula-meeting-on-myanmar/ Accessed on 2022–11–13)

[6] Amy Gunia, “Rohingya Activists Are Hoping That the Coup in Myanmar Will Be a Turning Point for Their Struggle,” TIME (2021). (https://time.com/5936604/myanmar-coup-rohingya Accessed on 2022–11–13)

[7] UNHCR, “Global Focus, The Rohingya Are an Ethnic Minority Who Have Been Denied Citizenship in Myanmar, Making Them the World’s Largest Stateless Population”. (https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/bangladesh#:~:text=As%20of%2031%20December%202023%2C%20971%2C904%20Rohingya%20refugees%20have%20been,Government%20of%20Bangladesh%20and%20UNHCR Accessed on 2024–9–25)

[8] Mahabuba Uddin, “Identity Crisis and Ethnic Cleansing in Myanmar: A Constructivist Analysis to Measure the Greater Value of ‘Identity’ Concerning Rohingya Crisis,” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, IOSR-JHSS, (2020, Series 9). (https://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2025%20Issue2/Series-9/G2502094554.pdf Accessed on 2022–11–28)

[9] T. Fenster , “Ethnicity and Citizen Identity in Planning and Development for Minority Groups”, Political Geography (2006) pp 405–418. /https://doi.org/10.1016/0962-6298(95)00067-4 Accessed on 2022–12–11)

[10] Jose Aleman and Dwayne Woods, “Inductive Constructivism and National Identities: Letting the Data Speak,” Journal of the Association for Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (2017). (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/nana.12320 Accessed on 2022–12–20)

[11] USHMM, “Burma’s Path of Genocide”. (https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/chapter-1/when-rohingya-were-citizens Accessed on 2022–12–20)

[12] Sara Wallace Goodman, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Citizenship and Integration Policy: Past Lessons and New Approaches,” SAGE Journals (2015). (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414015592648 Accessed on 2022–12–20)

[13] Burmese Rohingya Organization UK, “Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law and Rohingya,” Burma Campaign UK (2014). (https://burmacampaign.org.uk/media/Myanmar%E2%80%99s-1982-Citizenship-Law-and-Rohingya.pdf Accessed on 2023–1–6)

[14]The Union of Myanmar, “The Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law,” The State Peace and Development Council (2010). (https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Pyithu_Hluttaw_Election_Law_2010_ENG.pdf  Accessed on 2023–1–16)

[15] The Irrawaddy, “Govt Spokesman Rejects Calls for Rohingya Citizenship,” The Irrawaddy (2015). (https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govt-spokesman-rejects-calls-for-rohingya-citizenship.html Accessed on 2024–6–24)

[16] Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Scrap ‘Race and Religion Laws’ That Could Fuel Discrimination and Violence,” Amnesty International (2015). (https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/myanmar-race-and-religion-laws/ Accessed on 2023–1–16)

[17] Resource Information Center, “Burma [Myanmar]: State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/ State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)/ National League for Democracy (NLD)/Burmese Dissidents,” United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (1998). (https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df097254.html  Accessed on 2023–1–16)

[18] The ASEAN Post, “Myanmar Opposition Up Anti-Rohingya Rhetoric,” (2020). (https://theaseanpost.com/article/myanmar-opposition-anti-rohingya-rhetoric Accessed on 2023–1–16)

[19] Justice For Myanmar, “USDP-Led Government Used Extremist Buddhist Nationalism to Profit Military and Crony Owners of Mytel,” Justice For Myanmar (2020). (https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/usdp-led-government-used-extremist-buddhist-nationalism-to-profit-military-and-crony-owners-of-mytel Accessed on 2023–2–9)

[20] DVB, “UN Rejects Thein Sein’s Potential Rohingya Plan,” Reliefweb (2012). (https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/un-rejects-thein-sein%E2%80%99s-potential-rohingya-plan Accessed on 2023–2–9)

[21] Kofi Annan Foundation, “Advisory Commission on Rakhine State: A path to peace and prosperity,” Kofi Annan-led Rakhine Commission, (2016). (https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/advisory-commission-on-rakhine-state/ Accessed on 2025–6–9)

[22] UNHRC, “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” UNHRC (2017). (https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index Accessed on 2023–2–9)

[23] Z. B. Massey and I. A. Cionea, “A New Scale for Measuring Identity Insecurity,” Communication Methods and Measures (2023), pp. 1–19.

[24] S. Ting-Toomey, “Identity Negotiation Theory,” in J. Bennett (Ed.), Sage Encyclopedia of Intercultural Competence, Volume 1, pp. 418-422, (2015), Los Angeles, CA: Sage. (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/the-sage-encyclopedia-of-intercultural-competence/book238738)

[25] Jenny L. Davis, Tony P. Love, Phoenicia Fares, “Collective Social Identity: Synthesizing Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory Using Digital Data,” Social Psychology Quarterly (2019), 82-3, pp. 254–273. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/48588950 Accessed on 2023–2–11)

[26] Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” The American Political Science Review (1994). (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944711 Accessed on 2023–2–14)

[27] Brian Greenhill, “Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics,” SAGE Journals (2008) https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066108089246 Accessed on 2023–2–14)

[28] Mohamad Rosyidin, “Why Collective Identity Matters: Constructivism and the Absence of ASEAN’s Role in the Rohingya Crisis,” Asia-Pacific Social Science (2017).(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318225261_Why_collective_identity_matters_Constructivism_and_the_absence_of_ASEAN%27s_role_in_the_rohingya_crisis Accessed on 2023–2–14)

[29] A. Gunia, “Rohingya Activists See Opportunity in Myanmar Coup,” Time (2021). (https://time.com/5936604/myanmar-coup-rohingya/ Accessed on 2023–2–14)